Suppose TrusiMe is a web site that offers a new program for filing a federal tax return electronicall y with the IRS . It runs within your web browser and has all the latest forms, reflecting recent change s in the tax law . You 're happy because it means that now you don ' t have to buy and install softwar e for this purpose that may be obsolete next year . Instead, you can just rent it once for a small fee . Now, you know the program has only two output channels, each of which uses a networ k interface one channel is used to send your return to the IRS and the other is used to send billing information to Trustivle for the fee . You also know that it encrypts all information before it is sent on these channels using public keys belonging to TrustMe and the IRS . Since your browser runs the program, you take advantage of its security features by configuring it to be in "paranoi d mode"-any attempt by the code to read or write will be trapped, causing a dialog box to appea r requesting permission . After you complete your return, you are asked for billing information an d then one of these boxes appears . How do you respond? Saying "no", might cause the program t o terminate abnormally. On the other hand, saying "yes" also seems risky . How do you know this i s not an attempt to send information about your return back to Trustllle as well?
The state of the art for this kind of application is to use digital signatures . Here you would verify a digital signature that is computed over the program using TrustMe ' s private key. But this is not much help in the scenario above . It merely provides you with confirmation that th e program came from Trustivie so that they can be held accountable if some day you discover that the program did misbehave . By that time there is no telling how many "data warehouses" [13 1 already store the information .
But suppose we have a formal system, or logic, in which to reason about a program's abilit y to preserve privacy. Then our trust in a program could be based on the program itself, not o n some digital signature for it . Further, depending on the logic, we might even have an algorith m for deciding whether programs have "privacy proofs" in the logic . And this in turn could lea d to an efficient static program analyzer . All this requires that we make precise the sort of privac y properties we want our logics to guarantee . This note presents three privacy properties which we call confinement properties following Lampson [8] . Each is a kind of noninterference (NI ) property. Some simple syntactic conditions are discussed that are sufficient for guaranteeing the m in programs .
Confinement for Deterministic Program s
First we consider confinement in a deterministic language . The language is a simple imperativ e programming language with variables, integer-valued expressions, and typical commands like assignment, conditionals, and while loops . Every program is a command and it begins execution i n a memory that is a finite function mapping all variables in the program to integers . In order t o talk about privacy, we assume that every variable has a static attribute called its security level . It reflects the sensitivity of the integer values that can be stored there as information . Of course , there is nothing intrinsically sensitive about such a value, so imagine that these levels are assigne d to variables according to some program context where data becomes information . To keep th e discussion simple, suppose that there are just two such levels, low and high, for public and privat e information respectively. A program may use any variable of the memory and also knows which variables are low and which are high . So confinement, in these terms, means a guarantee that no program can copy the contents of a high variable to a low one . Basically, it says that altering the initial contents of high variables does not interfere with th e final value of any low variable [181 . Notice that changes in high variables may cause a program t o diverge, yet the program can still satisfy the definition . This may make the property unsuitable i n situations where this sort of behavior can be observed . In these cases, Definition 2 .1, given in the next section, may be a better choice .
The property is also limited to deterministic languages . It is easy to see that µ' and v ' can disagree on a low variable even though µ and v do not, if for instance we add a random numbe r generator to the language . Nondeterminism demands a different property . 2 
Confinement for Nondeterministic Program s
Suppose we introduce nondeterminism via a multi-threaded extension of our simple deterministi c language . A concurrent program 0 is a set of threads, each of which is a command in the sequentia l language above . Threads communicate through variables of a shared memory. Execution of a concurrent program begins in an initial shared memory and is a nondeterministic interleavin g of sequential thread instructions . IVIore precisely, suppose program execution is governed by the two rules in Figure 1 . Concurrent program transitions are denoted g, (global transitions) an d Intuitively, the first rule says that if we can pick some thread a from 0, and execut e it sequentially for one step in the shared memory µ, leaving a memory µ', then 0 can execute, in one step, to a pool where a is gone and the shared memory is now . The second rule treats th e case where a does not complete but rather is transformed into a continuation c ' representing what remains of c's execution after one step .
We have then the following confinement property for the nondeterministic language :
Definition 2 .1 A concurrent program 0 has the Possibilistic Noninterference property if for al l memories ,u, and v such that 1) µ(v) = v(v) for all low variables v, and 2) 0 can terminate successfully under µ yielding final memory µ', there is a memory v ' such that 0 can terminat e successfully under v yielding v' and µ' (v) = v' (v) for all low variables v .
It says that altering the initial contents of high variables does not interfere with the set of possible final values of any low variable [14] . The property rules out concurrent programs with informatio n channels that exploit thread synchronization. See the multi-threaded example in [14] . It uses thre e threads, one of which modulates the other two via semaphores, to copy a high variable to a lo w variable, one bit at a time . The program is perfectly reliable in that it can always copy a hig h variable to a low one when thread scheduling is fair . Suppose we prove that a program, executed using the interleaving semantics of Figure 1 , satisfie s the Possibilistic NI property . Then we can argue that we have perfect confinement . But it i s important to realize that when we build an implementation of our program, the situation may become more complicated .
If an implementation allows only a subset of the schedules possible under the Figure 1 Figure 1 if we equate "possible" with "has nonzero probability" . But now there is another problem since programs are probabilistic, the Possibilistic NI property is n o longer sufficient to ensure confinement . The trouble is that now changes to high variables might interfere with the probability (rather than the possibility) that a low variable has some final value . For instance, consider the program in Figure 2 . Suppose that x stores one bit and is high, y i s low, and that all threads have an equal probability of being scheduled . Is the program secure? If we equate possibility with nonzero probability then it has the Possibilistic NI property and therefor e cannot reveal x through y with certainty . However it is likely to reveal x . 1 Suppose x is O. The n the probability that y has final value 0 is 2/3 . When x is 1, however, the probability that y ha s final value 0 drops to 1/3 . In effect, the high variable interferes with the probability that y has final value 0 . This kind of interference has been termed probabilistic interference [5, 6, 11, 12] .
It is hard to imagine thread scheduling done by a machine that does not exhibit probabilisti c behavior . For this reason, it makes sense to consider a probabilistic semantics so that we can begin to reason about confinement in the presence of such behavior .
Confinement for Probabilistic Program s
Probability distributions arise in programming languages for various reasons . For instance, random number generators, with either discrete or continuous distributions, have long been a part o f programming . Another source can be thread scheduling, which programs like the one in Figure 2 can use . But perhaps this example suggests that scheduling is not the problem . After all, threa d a assigns a high variable to a low one! There are other ways, however, to exploit probabilisti c scheduling behavior that are not so obvious . One way is through timing differences . Consider th e following multi-threaded program : Suppose the two threads are scheduled by flipping a coin and that c is a command that takes a lon g time to execute . Then the threads run at roughly the same rate and (assuming x is 0 or 1) the valu e of x is copied to y with high probability . There is probabilistic interference here-a change in th e initial value of x changes the distribution of final values of y . So what is a reasonable formulatio n of confinement in the face of such scheduling ? Consider a scheduler that makes a fixed, discrete distribution available to a multi-threade d program . Recall that a concurrent program executes as a nondeterministic interleaving of sequentia l thread instructions . Suppose that at each step, the scheduler simply chooses a thread accordin g ' So y can be regarded as a noisy channel but it still has nonzero capacity for information flow . See Wittbold an d
Johnson [19] . to some distribution . We can treat the scheduler's probabilistic behavior within the framework o f a discrete IVlarkov chain [3] . Transitions between states of a concurrent program's execution ar e governed by conditional probabilities .
Given a multi-threaded program 0, let Qo be a set of initial configurations : The stochastic matrix T is defined so that T(q, q') is the probability that transition qg>q' occurs , for q, q ' E Q . Also, we let T(q, q) = 1 whenever q has the form ({ }, 1L) for some memory 1c . The terminal configuration ({ },,u,) is an absorbing state [3] . Finally, there is an initial distribution u o for Qo that completes the definition of the Markov chain . Kozen describes a denotational semantics for probabilistic programs where programs are interpreted as mappings from distributions to distributions [7] . A similar idea is useful in an operationa l semantics. One can define a trace of a multi-threaded program 0 as a sequence of probability distributions . The set of all distributions forms a vector space with addition and scalar multiplicatio n defined in the usual way . The distribution u l indicates that 0 can be in states q2 and q3 , each with a probability of 1/2 , after exactly one step . In general, the distribution after k steps is given by Uk = uoT' . It is interesting to note that 0 is probabilistically total and this can be observed by carrying ou t the trace further . Using Kozen's analogy, you can think of u k as a fluid mass distributed thoughout Q :
In the while loop [while B do S od], the mass goes around and around the loop ; at each cycle, the part of the mass which occupies -B breaks off and exits the loop, an d the rest goes around again . Part of the mass may go around infinitely often . Thus, at any point in time, there are different pieces of the mass that occupy different parts o f the program, and each piece is spread throughout the domain according to the simpl e and random assignments that have occurred in its history. Different pieces that have come to occupy the same parts of the program through different paths are accumulated . At certain points in time, parts of the mass find their way out of the program . (pg . 337, [7] )
In our example, mass is beginning to break off from the while loop after two steps and find its wa y out of the program to the terminal configuration (state q5) where it is accumulated since 4 5 is an absorbing state . After five steps, the mass at q 5 is 7/8 : So the probability that 0 terminates in at most five steps is 7/8 . As k goes to infinity, the mass a t q5 converges to 1 .
Now we can give a definition of confinement . First, we say that distributions u and u' are equivalent, written u u', if and only if they are equal after high variables are projected out . 
Definition 3 .1 Suppose T is the stochastic matrix of the Markov chain for a multi-threaded program O . Then 0 has the Probabilistic Noninterference property if for all probability distribution s u and u ' such that u ti u', we have uT u 'T .
This property demands a probabilistic, lockstep execution of 0 under memories that differ o n high variables . If we identify possibility with nonzero probability then it implies the Possibilistic N I property. Further, it implies NI as well since every deterministic program in our simple sequentia l language is just a single thread in the multi-threaded language . There are some syntactic conditions that can ensure these confinement properties in programs . Typ e systems exist for each of the three confinement properties . To illustrate, we sketch a type system fo r guaranteeing NI . More details on it can be found in [15, 18] . Every well-typed deterministic progra m in the system has the NI property . The rules are designed around the "certification" condition s developed years ago by Denning and Denning in their lattice model for secure information flo w [1, 2] . So the NI property carries over to their form of certification . This basically brings closur e to their work since there never was any satisfactory treatment of the kind of security propert y provided by certification.
We take security levels, like L (low) and H (high), as our basic types which we denote b y 'r . Some typing rules treat what Denning calls "direct" flows and others treat "indirect" flows . Assignments give rise to direct flows . The typing rule for an assignment x := e is yfr :racc, -y I-e :T
(1) y l-x :=e :T cmd
In order for the assignment to be well typed, it must be tha t • x is a variable of type T acc(eptor), meaning x is capable of storing information at securit y level T, and
• expression e has type T, meaning every variable in e has type T . 2
Information about x is provided by y which maps identifiers to types . So, the rule states that i n order for the assignment x := e to be judged secure, x must be a variable that stores informatio n at the same security level as e . If this is true, then the rule allows us to ascribe type r cmd to th e entire assignment command . The command type T cmd tells us that every variable assigned to b y the command (here only x) can accept information of security level T or higher (actually this is th e Type Analog of the *-property-see below) . The command types are needed to treat guarded commands securely . For example, the typin g rule for conditionals is The idea is that c l and c2 execute in a context where information about the value of e is implicitly available when c l executes, the value of e was true and when c2 executes, the value of e was false .
Hence if e : T, then cl and c2 must not transmit any information to variables of security level lowe r than T . This is enforced by requiring c l and c 2 to have type r cmd.
Here is the typing rule for while loops : The typing rules for expressions and commands simply require all sub expressions and subcommands to be typed at the same security level . For example, we require in rule (1) that the left an d 2Keep in mind that an expression of type T here does not mean one that evaluates to a value of type T . Value s (in our case integers) have no intrinsic security levels . right sides of an assignment be typed at the same level . A similar requirement is imposed in rul e (2) . Yet we do want to allow upward information flows, such as from low to high . But the typin g rules can remain simple because upward flows can be accommodated naturally through subtyping . For example, we would have Intuitively, Simple Security guarantees that there is no "read up" in expressions, and the * -property ensures no `"write down" in commands . For example, Simple Security ensures that i f an expression has type L, then it contains no variables of type H var . Likewise, the *-property guarantees that if a command has type H cmd, then it contains no assignments to variables of type L var . With these two properties, one can prove that every well-typed program in our simpl e deterministic language has the NI property [18] .
The properties of Possibilistic and Probabilistic NI in the multi-threaded language can be obtained by restricting the typing of while loops . This is done to treat thread synchronization an d nontermination securely . The rule for while loops becomes Every well-typed, multi-threaded program in this system has the Possibilistic NI property [14] . Moreover, if we also require that every total command with a high guard executes atomically, the n every well-typed program has the Probabilistic NI property [17] .
All of these type systems are decidable and have been proved sound . In each system, this has meant giving up completeness . For instance, the problem of deciding whether a program, written i n our simple deterministic language of Section 1, has the NI property is not recursively enumerable . So any sound and recursively enumerable logic for reasoning about NI must be incomplete .
Conclusio n
This note has presented three confinement properties for programming languages . There are certainly other aspects to security in programming languages, as we have argued in 116] . Privacy is jus t one component . Simple syntactic conditions exist for guaranteeing various forms of confinement and they can easily be checked by machine . It is our hope that such conditions will be employe d in practice as part of an overall trend towards lessening, if not eliminating entirely, the need for a d hoc sorts of trust frameworks based on cryptography.
